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This study examines the multiple listing phenomena by studying 
the characteristics of the hosting and listing countries and listing 
firms  of  the  multiple-listed  stocks.  We  document  the  loss  of 
preeminence of the US as a preferred hosting country, this role 
now being taken by the EU. We find that generally larger firms 
with higher returns and enhanced growth prospects tend to list in 
multiple  markets.  They  grow  larger  and  received  higher 
overvaluations from investors with each additional foreign listing.    
A  positive  listing  premium  is  found  but  it  diminishes  as  the 
listing order goes up and increases as the listing dates become 
more  recent.    Listing  premiums  of  different  orders  relate  to 
different country characteristics. We find no evidence to support 
the bonding hypothesis.  
  
I. Introduction 
The  growth  of  international  integration  among  world  capital  markets  since  the 
1970’s  has  been  driven  in  part  by  the  phenomena  of  corporations  seeking  additional 
listings for their shares and corporate bonds in countries other than their home market. 
There has been a proliferation of literature on the international listing phenomena since 
the 1970’. Studies show that the effect of cross listings in a foreign country is mostly 
positive. Early Studies argue that cross listing enables the companies to  reduce their cost 
of  capital,  increase  the  liquidity  of  their  securities,  reduce  trading  frictions,  increase 
visibility and facilitate increased information flow (Errunza and Losq 1985, Merton, 1987, 
Alexander,  Eun  and  Janakiramanan,  1988,  Foerster  and  Karolyi,  1993,  Jayaraman, 
Shastri, and Tandon, 1993, Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver 2002). More  recent studies 
investigate  international  listings  from  the  perspective  of  how  it  impacts  on  corporate 
governance  (La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (LLSV)  1997,  1998, 
Doidge 2004 and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004). Despite the fact that quite a number 
of  companies  list  sequentially  in  multiple  overseas  markets,  the  preponderance  of 
research  on  foreign  listings  focus  on  stocks  listed  in  two  countries  (dual  listing). 
According to Sarkissian and Schill (2004) about 20% of internationally listed stocks are 
listed in more than one foreign market. For example, DataStream shows that Bayer alone 
is listed in 11 countries.  
Given the received benefits of dual-listing, why might a firm subsequently list in 
additional markets?  How are the additional listing markets related to the company’s first 
foreign listing markets? What types of firms tend to list in additional foreign markets? 
What are the consequences of sequential multiple cross listings for the investors? What 
types of listing countries are favored by corporate and investors and how do investors 
behave toward additional listings? We strive to provide some preliminary  answers to 
these questions in this paper. 
 We  start  by  examining  the  broad  picture  of  the  geography  and  timing  of  the 
multiple listing using a comprehensive dataset of multi-listed stocks (stocks listed in 2, 3   3 
and 4 markets
1). It shows that most of the multiple listed stocks are placed in developed 
countries, with U.S. being the largest initial listing hosting country and Germany the 
largest second and third time listing hosting country. Hosting markets typically share 
similar institution structures. We also find that international listing lost its momentum 
after 2000. The attraction of the US as a market for international listings declines after 
2000, and especially for second and higher order listings. This place of preeminence has 
now been taken by the EU, in particular Germany.  
We then examine firm level data to gain better understanding of the determinants 




foreign listings. We find that large firms with high returns tend to list in more foreign 
markets and firms appear to become larger with each additional listing. Other issues are 
not as clear cut, with leverage and valuation increasing but received returns decreasing on 
a second listing, this being reversed for a third listing.  
We also report the multiple listing consequences for investors in terms of stock 
valuation. We find a generally positive cross listing effect on stock prices, a cross-listing 
premium, which is increasing in recent  years but decreasing with the  order of cross-
listings. We then examine country characteristics to identify what countries are perceived 
by investors as favorable and test the recent major hypothesis related to oversea listing. 
Overall,  we  find  that  listing  premiums  of  different  order  relate  to  different  country 
characteristics.  Contrary  to  previous  findings,  our  results  do  not  provide  evidence  to 
support the bonding hypothesis.  The listing premium is also negatively related to the 
listing  country’s  Rule  of  Law,  which  further  contradicts  the  bonding  hypothesis.  We 
conclude that firms list in additional foreign firms perhaps not so much to benefit from a 
better legal environment, but to seek to raise more capital in developed countries as such 
listing firms generally experiencing fast growth.  
This study also makes several other contributions, including an analysis of how 
investor behavior leads to stock reaction to foreign listing, as well as an examination of 
the impact of rule of law, economic freedom and culture on foreign listing. 
II. Literature Review 
                                                 
1 We ignore any higher order listing since there are not many observations for each case. Fore example we 
find 40 stocks listed in 5 markets and 10 stocks listed in 6 markets.   4 
Most of the previous studies on cross listing report a positive listing premium on 
listing  dates  or  announcement  dates.  For  example,  Miller  (1999)  provides  a 
comprehensive study using the announcement date, wherein he examines the cross listing 
of firms onto U.S. market between 1985 and 1995. He reports a 1.15% listing premium. 
Similar results are also reported by Foerster and Karolyi (1998, 1999), Mittoo (2003), 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004) and etc. A number of studies report either slightly positive or 
neutral market reactions to foreign listing such as Lee, 1991, Torabzadeh, Bertin and 
Ziveney, 1992, Varela and Lee 1993a, 1993b  and Lau et al., 1994) 
Early studies on cross listing argue that by listing their stocks in foreign markets, 
firms  can  reduce  the  cost  of  capital  through  reducing  risk  exposures  for  investors, 
reducing investment barriers, and increasing stock liquidity.  Recent studies attribute the 
positive listing premium to improved corporate governance. But the most obvious reason 
for foreign listing is that the firm needs more equity capital for new investment. In this 
case, firms tend to be fast growing or have low debt capacity. Therefore, these firms 
should be characterized by having a high price to earning ratio and a high debt to equity 
ratio. These firms are likely to list in more developed countries or markets with more 
developed capital markets, which typically provide capital at a lower cost. 
By  listing  stocks  in  foreign  markets,  the  companies  can  also  reduce  existing 
investor  risk  exposures  since  investors  are  able  to  diversify  their  portfolios  globally 
(Alexander et al. (1987), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) and Errunza and Losq (1985)). 
Such  listing  also  mitigates  against  the  effects  of  market  segmentation  by  reducing 
investment barriers, and may improve information flow (Brennan and Cao 1997), all of 
which may help reduce the cost of capital. Some studies associate the positive listing 
premium with increased liquidity since listing in a foreign market might enable a firm to 
have access to a market with better liquidity than its home market. For example, Mittoo 
(1992), and Fanto and Karmel (1997) surveyed corporate mangers and conclude that the 
increased liquidity is the major motivation for cross listing. Foerster and Karolyi (1998) 
also provide some evidence to attribute the positive listing premium to increased liquidity.  
 More recent studies associate the positive listing premium with improved corporate 
governance.  Stulz  (1999)  suggests  that  agency  problems  and  asymmetric  information 
lead  to  difference  between  management  and  investor  in  valuations  of  the  firm  and   5 
projects.  Many  researchers  argue  that  the  cross  listing  of  stocks  from  developing 
countries in developed countries subjects the firm to a more stringent disclosure and legal 
environment than its home country, consequently, lending investors more legal protection.  
Recent  empirical  studies  generally  provide  support  for  this  so  called  “bonding 
hypothesis”.  For  example,  Doidge  et  al.  (2004)  document  positive  listing  premium 
around  the  listing  on  the  U.S.  markets  as  compared  to  non-listing  firms.  They  also 
document that the listing premium is higher for firms from countries with poor investor 
protection. Additional support is also provided by Doidge (2004) Ayyagari (2004) and 
Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller and Stulz (2005, 2008), O’connor (2006), Lel and Miller 
(2008). 
Opponents of the bonding hypothesis (for example Burns, Francis and Hasan, 2007 
and Siegel, 2005) often argue that legal and regulatory bonding by cross-listed firms may 
be  more  limited  than  often  assumed.  A  country  might  have  high  level  of  investor 
protection law, but that does not necessarily lead to the fact that the law is effectively 
enforced and the investors are duly protected. For this reason, in addition to Investor 
Protection Index, measures of the Rule of Law are also included in this study. The Rule 
of Law is defined broadly as the principle that all members of society are bound by a set 
of  clearly  defined  and  universally  accepted  laws.  It  is  more  comprehensive  than  the 
investor protection index in that it also indicates the degree of enforcement of the investor 
protection law. One would expect that if bonding hypothesis is true, the Rule of Law will 
be positively related to the listing premium.  
Besides  the  Investor  Protection  Index  and  Rule  of  Law,  we  also  examine  other 
country characteristics such as Economics Freedom and Culture to investigate the type of 
listing markets are favored by investors. Economic philosophers such as Smith, Friedman, 
and Hayek all stress that freedom of exchange and market coordination provides the fuel 
for economic progress. Counties that score strongly in these areas are more attractive as a 
location for a foreign listing as it can provide growth opportunity for the company. Some 
studies  (Greif,  1994  and  Stulz  and  Williamson,  2003)  argue  that  culture  plays  an 
important role in explaining the society and economy. Stulz et. al (2003) asserts that “a 
country’s culture could affect both how financial markets are viewed within that country   6 
and how they contribute to social welfare.” Given these arguments, indices of culture 
index and economic freedom are included in this study.  
All of the abovementioned studies on cross listing focus on stocks listed in one 
single well developed country. Moreover, those studies examine the dual listing effect 
(the  listing  of  stocks  two  countries)  and  ignore  any  additional  foreign  listings.  By 
contrast, this study uses stocks multi-listed in 56 countries, including both developed and 
developing  countries.  The  multiple  listings  (the  listing  of  stocks  in  more  than  two 
countries)  of  companies  are  examined  in  a  sequential  order.  The  listing  effects  of 
different orders are compared and the effects of different country characteristics on the 
different listing premiums are examined.  
III. Data  
Details of the multi-listed stocks are obtained from Datastream. We include both 
delisted, dead, and listing stocks. Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999) 
report significant delisting bias in the major exchanges in U.S. Therefore, unlike previous 
studies which only consider currently listed survivor stocks, this dataset is unlikely to 
suffer  from  survivorship  bias.  Since  different  levels  of  listings  may  well  generate 
different results as the regulatory and legal environment within which they operate is 
quite distinct, we only include direct main market listings in foreign markets in our study, 
excluding Rule 144 and equivalents, as well as ADR’s and GDR’s.  For stocks listed in 
more than one exchange in one country, only the first (earliest) listing is considered. To 
disentangle the effect of consequential listings for the same stock have to occur at least 3 
months apart
2.  Since this dataset on stocks listed in 3 countries are heavily dominated by 
listings in the U.S. and Germany
3, the listings in the dataset of stocks in 2 countries is 
limited  to  weight  less  than  23%  for  each  country
4.  This  way,  it  lowers  the  overall 
dominance of the U.S. and Germany markets and also enables us to compare the results 
from a set of more balanced listings to listings in more developed countries. 
                                                 
2 If, for example, the 1
st and 2
nd foreign listings occur within 3 months, then the 2
nd listing is ignored and the 
3
rd foreign listing becomes the 2
nd foreign listing. 
3Germany is hosting many foreign listings in our sample partly due to the trading flat form XETRA, which 
is based in Germany but adopted by several other stock exchanges. But even if we exclude stocks listed on 
XETRA, listings in 3 or 4 markets are still dominated by listings in Germany. 
4 23% is chosen on the basis that it allow us a minimum number of 70 observations in the smallest sample.    7 
  For each stock, we collect daily home/primary market prices and the local main 
market index in local currency surrounding the listing dates.
5  We use the listing date as 
opposed to the announcement date as the event date from which we proceed. There are a 
number of reasons informing this choice: first, many firms announce their intention of 
foreign listing yet never actually follow through for a variety of reasons. Second, listing 
is a complex process that takes from several months to several years to complete. This 
delay implies that the listing date is less noisy than the announcement date.  
Each stock is required to have at least 30 days of daily prices available for the 
estimation period.
6. Upon further filtering the number of multiple-listed stocks is reduced 
to 813 companies with 1364 foreign listings in 56 countries. Table 1 provides detailed 
information on home and listing country of the sample. Table 2 summarizes the listings 
dates, listing regions and listing countries with different levels of the Investor Protection 
Index  (IPI).    Table  3  summarizes  changes  in  the  listing  regions.  Table  4  details  the 
variables used. 
The choice of variables for the firms, the listing and home markets stemmed from 
our efforts to identify the driving forces behind multiple listing. They are also limited by 
the availability of data source.  The total asset, debt to equity ratio, return on equity and 
the price to earning (P/E) ratio and number of employees are collected for each firm 
during  the  listing  year  from  DataStream  and  WorldScope.  These  firm  level  data  are 
examined to analyze what types of firm tend to list in additional markets and the listing 
effect on the firm characteristics. The measure for shareholders protection is Investor 
Protection  Index  (IPI)  constructed  by  LLSV  (1998).  According  to  recent  empirical 
studies, the cross listed firms can effectively  bond themselves to the listing market’s 
investor protection law, one of the incentives to go international listing. The degree of 
Economics Freedom, which is provided by Frasier Institute, ranges from 0 to 10, with 
higher values indicating greater economic freedom. The Rule of Law is obtained from 
World Bank and it lies between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to a more 
rigid adherence to the Rule of Law. The Culture index is obtained from the Hofstede 
                                                 
5 Sometimes, a stock is not listed in their home market before it lists on a foreign market (primary market). 
we do not differentiate its home market from its primary market. 
6 We obtained more than 400 stocks listed in 2 and 3 markets. Due to limitation of the event study software, 
Eventus,  employed  in  this  study,  the  numbers  of  stocks  in  each  case  (listed  in  2,  3  and  4  countries 
respectively) is limited to be less than 400. We randomly select 400 or less stocks for 2 and 3 market case.   8 
Cultural Dimensions, with values ranging from 0 to 100. High values indicate a high 
degree of inequality, collectivism, difference in role/value of gender and less tolerance of 
different opinions. These variables are country specific and they are employed to study 
the effect of country characteristics on listing premium and examine what types of  listing 
markets are favored by investors.  
IV. Methodology 
The standard event study methodology by Fama, Fisher Jensen and Roll (1969) 
(FFJR)  and  Brown  and  Warner  (1980,  1985)  is  employed  to  calculate  the  abnormal 
returns surrounding listing dates. The listing date is defined as the event date, day 0. The 
estimation period corresponds to day (-250, -30) relative to the event date
7. The abnormal 
returns (AR) are residual errors from market model.  
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where  it AR is the abnormal return for stock i at time t.   it R  and  t m R , is the realized return 
for stock i and the market at time t. Mean Abnormal Returns are obtained by averaging 
the AR across the multiple-listed stocks.  
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The abnormal returns are then accumulated during two event windows: 10 days 
before the listing and 2 days following the listing to obtain the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR).  
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                                                 (3) 
To determine statistical significance, the Patell Z test, Generalized Sign Z test and 
cross-sectional T test are computed for each cumulative abnormal return. The Patell Z 
test is a standardized abnormal return test which estimates a separate standard error for 
each security-event and assumes cross-sectional independence. The generalized sign test 
adjusts for the fraction of positive abnormal returns in the estimation period instead of 
assuming 0.5.  The standardized cross-sectional test introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci 
and  Poulsen  (1991)  is  an  extension  of  the  Patell  test.  It  controls  for  event  induced 
                                                 
7 We also repeat the analysis for a different estimation period (-90, 160) to check the robustness of the 
results and find similar results.    9 
increases in variance.  As previous studies have noted that most of international listings 
occur during the 1990’s and waned thereafter, we also check whether the listing benefit 
varies over time. The CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) is accumulated over different 
time periods, listing regions and various differences between the IPI of home country and 
listing country to examine listing effect. Finally, CARs from different types of listings are 
regressed on a set of country characteristic variables to analyze the possible effect of 
country characteristics on consequential listing. 
V. Empirical Results 
A.  Distribution of Multiple Listings   
Table 1 summarizes the home and listing countries for our sample of multiple-listed 
stocks. There are 339, 397 and 77 stocks listed in 1, 2 and 3 foreign markets respectively.  
There are 813 first listings (listing in a foreign country for the first time), 474 second 
listings (list in a second foreign country) and 77 third listings (list in a third foreign 
country). Table 1 shows that in the 2 market case (firms listed in two markets: home 
market and one foreign market), the U.S. is the largest individual hosting country with 76 
out of 339 total listings. This is reasonable considering the advantages which the US has 
possessed  over  the  other  developed  markets:  a  historically  superior  U.S.  economic 
performance, deeper and more developed capital markets, superior investor protection  
and a lower cost of listing  
In the 3 market case US dominance is still apparent, but it is no longer the largest 
listing country. Germany emerges as the largest recipient of second and third foreign 
listings. This finding indicates that the potential benefit and motivation of initial foreign 
listing may well differ from subsequent cross listing.  Most of the firms originate in 
developed countries with only a few of them from developing countries. 
We omit a detailed host-foreign listing crosstabulation for space considerations, but, 
the patterns for first time listing in this paper are generally in line with previous findings. 
Canadian firms for example are likely to list in the US and European firms tend to list in 
EU countries. The similar culture between the home market and the foreign market found 
in first time listing also applies to the second and third time listing. The second and third 
listing countries tend to have similar institutional structure to the home or the first foreign 
market.  Most of the second and third listings are placed in the developed countries.   10 
Table  2  summarizes  the  listings  dates,  listing  regions  and  listing  countries  with 
different Investor Protection Index (IPI). Interestingly most of the firms are listed in a 
country with a lower IPI than the home market for the first, second and third time listing. 
This seems to contradict the possibility that the major motivation for multiple listing is to 
improve investor protection.
8 In terms of the listing period, most of the stocks were cross 
listed in 1990s, including their second and third listings, which is consistent with the 
momentum of cross listing in 90s.  In terms of  geographical distribution, most of the 
stocks are cross listed in Europe and U.S. 
9 
Table 3 reports changes in listing patterns in US and EU over time. 80% and 56% 
respectively of the listing in the U.S. and EU are placed during 1990s; thereafter these 
values decline to 27% and 35%.  This shows that the phenomena of international listing 
lost its momentum after 2000. The U.S. market clearly became less attractive to foreign 
firms as compared with EU markets, consequent to the rising listing costs and tightening 
regulations in US (Litvak 2007). This pattern in changes is more evident for stocks listed 
in more than two markets. For example, in the 2 market case, 40% of companies choose 
the US for the first listing after 2000, only 9% in the 3 market case and none in the 4 
market case choose to list in US for their first listing, compared  to 62%, 16% and 39% 
for the EU.  
B.  Firm Characteristics  
Table 5 summarizes the distribution of industries for the multiple listed firms. The 
majority of the multiple listed firms are from Industrial industry, followed by Technology 
and then Financial industry. The Telecommunication and Utilities industries have the 
least number of companies listed in foreign countries. Industrials have the most number 
of dually listed firms, Technology companies dominate the stocks listed in 3 countries, 
and Financial firms accounts for the largest percentage of firms listed in 4 countries. 
 Table 6 summarized accounting data for the multiple listed stocks. Only key items 
are obtained from the DataStream and Worldscope.
10 All ratios are filtered by truncating 
the  top  and  bottom  5%  values.  We  also  remove  highly  leveraged  corporations 
                                                 
8 One might argue that if we include indirect listing such as ADR and GDR, this result will change. 
However, compared to direct listing, indirect listing only accounts for a small percentage of total foreign 
listing. Therefore, mostly likely, the results will not change much. 
9 Though it is not shown in the table, only a few of multiple listed stocks are from developing countries. 
10 This is due to limited access to the data source.   11 
(characterized by high D/E ratio) such as banks and trusts as well as firms with negative 
D/E and M/B ratios.  
Table 6 shows that, even upon the 1
st listing, stocks listed in 4 markets have much 
larger values of total assets ($22.51 million for 1
st listing) than firms listed in two ($3.93 
million upon 1
st listing) or three markets ($4.01million upon 1
st listing). This shows that 
large firms tend to list in more countries. It also shows that with each foreign listing, the 
total assets increase. Such increase is especially sharp for stocks listed in four markets 
upon the second listing. Similar, the number of employees goes up as the stocks list in the 
2
nd and 3
rd foreign country. 
Pagano, Röelland and Zechner (2002) find that dually listed firms tend to decrease 
leverage upon the first foreign listing. Somewhat different from their findings, Table 6 
shows that the D/E ratio tends to get higher after the 2
nd foreign listing compared to the 
1
st listing. Firms listed in three markets have D/E ratios of 58.57% after the first listing 
which on second listing rises to 62.93%, firms in four markets have D/E ratio of 61.63% 
on their first listing and 81.11% after the second listings. The firms listed in four markets, 
however, decreased their leverage after the third listing.  
The M/B ratio also increases with each additional foreign listing, indicating the 
perception  of  overvaluation  by  investors  of  multiple  listed  firms  increases  with  each 
foreign listing. Similar to leverage, the P/E ratio increases upon the second listing but 
decreases upon the third listing.  However, return on equity decreases with 2
nd foreign 
listing and rises slightly after the 3
rd foreign listing notwithstanding that the leverage 
actually increases after the  2
nd and decreases after the 3
rd foreign listing.   
If we compare only the first listing for different cases, firms listed in 2 markets have 
relatively low total assets, less employees, lower debt capacity, lower valuations, and 
lower P/E ratio and returns on equity. This indicates that larger firms with better future 
growth prospects and higher returns tend to list in more markets. While cross-listing 
generally leads to more employees, more assets and higher overvaluation from investors, 
the second and third listings lead to different characteristics. The 2
nd listing is associated   12 
with a higher debt ratio and P/E ratio and lower ROE, while the third listing typically 
reduces the leverage and P/E ratio and increases the ROE.  
C.  Consequences for Shareholders  
           C.1 Price Reaction 
This section examines the consequences for shareholders of multiple cross-listing in 
terms of return. Table 7 reports the Mean Abnormal Returns (MAR) from the market 
model ten days before and two days after the cross listing. The second column reports the 
MAR for stocks listed in two markets for the 1
st foreign listing. The third and fourth 
column reports the MAR of stocks listed in three countries for the 1
st and 2
nd time foreign 
listing respectively. The last three columns present the MAR for the stocks listed in four 
markets in a consequential order. Overall, there is evidence of positive abnormal returns 
before the foreign listing as the most of the MAR are positive in the (-10, -1) window and 
some  are  significant.  The  abnormal  returns  in  the  two  days  following  the  listing  are 
almost all negative.  
The  same  conclusion  is  reached  in  Table  8,  which  summarizes  the  Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) over the (-10, -1) and (1, 2) windows.  The CARs in the 0 days 
before the listing are mostly positive and significant whereas the two-day CARs after the 
foreign listing are all negative except for stocks listed in 4 markets for the 1
st listing. The 
CARs in Table 8 also indicate declining abnormal returns as the listing order goes up.  
For stocks listed in 3 markets, the pre-listing CAR for the 1
st listing (1.51%) is higher and 
more significant than the second listing (0.82%). for stocks listed in 4 markets, the pre-
listing CAR for the 1
st listing (1.3%) is higher and more significant than the 2
nd listing 
(0.54%) which in turn is more significant than the 3
rd listing. The CAR for the 3
rd listing 
is even negative (-0.41%), although not highly significant.  
Most  of  the  previous  studies  on  cross  listing  focus  on  a  few  highly  developed 
markets, such as the U.S. and the U.K. markets, therefore, the cross listing effect in less 
developed markets is unclear. For stocks listed in 2 countries, we limit the stocks listed 
on U.S. market and every other market to less than 23% of the total listings and the 
results reflect the more general effect of cross listing. The results indicate that overall, 
there  exists  a  positive  listing  premium  even  if  countries  with  various  degrees  of 
development  are  included.  There  some  evidence  to  show  that  the  listing  premium   13 
diminishes as the listing order goes up. Compared to the positive price reaction to the first 
foreign listing, the additional foreign listings do not generate significant upward price 
changes for investors. 
C.2  Grouped  CARs 
The abovementioned listing premiums, especially the listing premium from the first 
listing  may  be  due  to  the  dominance  of  the  observed  listing  premium  in  one  highly 
industrialized country or it may be due to returns over a certain period. To disentangle the 
listing effect of different factors, we obtain the CAR for each stock by accumulating the 
abnormal returns during the window (-10, -1) for each stock. 








t i i AR CAR                                                 (4) 
Then the CAR for each stock is filtered by removing the top and bottom 5% values. The 
filtered  individual stock’s CAR are grouped according to listing period, the difference 
between the IPI of home and listing country, and listing regions. Table 9 reports the 
results.   
Overall,  the  CARs  from  the  first  listing  are  more  closely  related  to  the 
abovementioned factors with  the CARs of the 2
nd listing moderately related to the factors 
and the CARs from the third listing unrelated to any of the factors.   
In terms of listing region, only the U.S. and highly developed markets in Asia-
Pacific region have a significantly 1
st listing premium.
11 In terms of listing time, the 1st 
listing premium increases in recent years. International listings of stock were negatively 
compensated  before  1990s  with  an  average  10  day  abnormal  return  of  -0.5%.  The 
abnormal return before listing is a significant 1.54% for stocks listed during 1990s and 
2.45 % after 1990s.   
In terms of the difference in IPI between home country and listing country, stocks 
listed in countries with lower IPI than their home country still show a positive listing 
premium from their 1
st listing of 1.25%.  Listing in a country with the same IPI yields a 
listing premium of 3.78%.  This shows that it is the stocks listed in a country with a 
similar IPI to their home countries that have the largest positive CARs for the 1
st listing, 
                                                 
11 This is rather surprising since one would expect positive listing premium for EU region. But EU actually 
includes many less developed countries as compared to USA or Singapore, for example, Romania, 
Hungary, Poland, Greece, etc.   14 
not those stocks listed in country with higher IPI than their home country. Moreover, in 
the  next  section  we  also  show  a  significant  and  positive  relationship  between  listing 
premium and the home country’s IPI. These findings contradict the results reported by 
Doidge et al. (2004), who conclude that stocks from countries with poor IPI benefit more 
from listing in the US. However, they only employ a single listing country, which makes 
it difficult to fully evaluate the effect of IPI of home and foreign country. The present 
data set includes stocks cross listed in 56 countries, therefore, we are able to  separate the 
effect of listing and home country’ IPI. It shows that not only the listing country’s IPI 
matters, but also that home country’s IPI has a positive impact on the listing premium. 
This  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  when  stocks  from  developed  countries  with  good 
investor protection environment are listed in other developed countries with similar IPI, 
the more educated or trusting investors in the home country recognize the benefit of the 
foreign listing.  When the stocks from countries with poor investor protection are listed in 
a country with better investor protection, the investors in the home country, who typically 
do not trust the managers, have more doubt regarding the management’s motive for the 
foreign listings.     
Overall, Table 9 shows that the significant 1
st listing premium is related more to the 
degree of development of the listing countries than to IPI improvement. This finding 
implies that the bonding hypothesis provides only a limited explanation for the listing 
premium and that the firms list in foreign markets to raise capital instead of improving 
corporate governance. 
As for the 2
nd listing premium, it is significant only for stocks listed in countries 
with superior IPI, or stocks listed during the 90s and those listed in EU countries. For the 
3
rd listing premium, it is not significant at all for various groups. The characteristics of 
sequential multiple cross listings differ as the number of listings increase.  This indicates 
that what applies to the 1
st listing premium may not be true for the higher order listings. 
Further analysis is needed for 2
nd and 3
rd order listings, which may shed more light on 
foreign listings. 
 
D.  Cross-Sectional Regression and Univariate Test   15 
To  examine  the  explanatory  power  of  the  country  characteristics  and  to  reduce 
spurious  correlations,  we  need  to  employ  regression  analysis.    The  listing  premium 
regressed on a set of explanatory variables, including the country variables and a set of 
dummy variables. This regression gives us better idea of what types of listing countries 
are favored by investors and further reveal investor’s behavior toward multiple listing. 
The country variables include Investor Protection Index (IPI), Economics Freedom, Rule 
of Law and Culture Index for each country. The dummy variables are set up to examine 
the  difference  between  listings  in  regions  of  various  degree  of  development  (North 
America, Europe, Asian-Pacific Developed countries and Emerging/developing Markets). 
Table 10 reports regression results.  
Consistent with the findings in Table 9, Table 10 shows that the 1st listing premium 
is significantly and positively related to both the home country and 1
st listing country IPI, 
if only these two factors are considered. Investors favor listing countries with higher IPI 
if  only  IPI  is  considered.  According  to  the  bonding  hypothesis;  the  listing  premium 
should be negatively correlated to the home country  IPI and positively related to the 
listing country’s IPI. The positive relationship between the listing premium and the home 
country  IPI  indicate  that  the  investors  from  a  country  with  better  investor  protection 
environment see the foreign listing as more beneficial than do investors from a country 
with poorer investor protection. 
As other variables are added, the IPI of listing country loses its explanation power. 
We  also  see  that  the  premium  from  the  first  foreign  listing  is  positively  related  to 
Economics Freedom and negatively correlated with the Rule of Law of the listing country, 
but this relationship is not significant. Among the dummy variables, North America and 
the Asia-Pacific developed countries have a positive influence on listing premium, while 
the EU and emerging markets are negatively related to the listing premium. But only in 
North America is the positive listing effect significant. This is consistent with the finding 
in  Table  10  that  the  1
st  listing  premium  is  related  to  the  listing  country’s  degree  of 
development.  This  shows  that  the  1
st  listings  in  developed  countries  are  favored  by 
investors. 
Similar to the first listing premium, the second listing premium is positively related 
to the 2
nd listing country’s Economics Freedom and negatively related to the 2
nd listing   16 
country’s rule of  law. These relationships are significant. The CAR from the 3
rd listing is 
significantly related to the Culture, Rule of Law of listing country and the IPI of the first 
listing country. This shows that the country characteristics like Economics Freedom and 
Culture do affect the listing premium but only for higher order listings. The 2
nd and 3
rd 
listing premium is both negatively related to the listing country’s IPI level although this 
relation is not statistically significant. The bonding hypothesis is further undermined as 
the CARs are all negatively related to the Rule of Law and are significant for the 2
nd and 
3
rd listing. Interestingly, the 2
nd and 3
rd listing premium is both negatively related to the 
first listing country’s IPI level. This indicates that once a stock is cross listed in a market 
with better IPI, any additional foreign listing is perceived by the investor as being less 
beneficial, which also corroborates the significant negative relationship between the Rule 
of Law and higher order listing premium. These results indicate that bonding hypothesis 
can’t explain the multiple listing of stocks, which supports Burns, Francis and Hasan 
(2007) claim that the bonding effect is often limited 
Overall, the regression analysis shows that generally countries with a higher degree 
of development are favored by investors. Countries with better Economics Freedom are 
favored by investors for the 2




Past research on cross listing generally concentrates on stocks dual-listed in one 
single highly developed country such as U.S. or U.K. Listings in less developed countries 
are ignored and additional foreign listings after the first listing are not studied. Since 
many stocks are listed in more than one foreign country, studying only the 1
st listing may 
represent  an  incomplete  analysis  of  foreign  listings.  The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to 
alleviate  the  above  mentioned  issues  by  examining  the  multiple  listed  stocks.  The 
comprehensive dataset enables us to examine the multiple issues in different angles from 
previous studies. 
Employing a set of multiple listed stocks in 56 countries which does not suffer from 
survivorship bias, this study covers not only the listing in the highly developed regions 
but also those in less developed countries. The listing is studied in a sequential order to 
examine not only the first, but also the second and third listing in foreign countries.    17 
 We  find  firms  tend  to  list  in  countries  with  similar  institutions  to  their  home 
markets. The U.S. market has become less attractive to foreign firms as more of them list 
in EU countries. Large firms with higher returns and better growth prospects tend to list 
in  additional  markets  and  grow  larger  and  receive  higher  overvaluation  with  each 
additional foreign listing. The 2
nd listing is associated with a higher debt ratio and P/E 
ratio, and lower ROE, while the third listing typically reduces the leverage and P/E ratio 
and increases the ROE slightly.  
Overall,  there  exists  a positive  listing  premium,  which  diminishes  as  the  listing 
order rises and increases with time. The significant 1
st order listing premium is dominated 
by positive listing premiums in highly developed countries. Investors behave differently 
toward additional foreign listings. The positive relationship between the home country 
IPI and the listing premium is found and attributed to the investors’ behaviors.  
Bonding hypothesis is found to have limited explanation power: while it is true that 
the  listing  premium  from  the  first  foreign  listing  is  typically  higher  for  listings  in 
countries with higher IPI than the other way around, it is the listings in countries with 
similar IPI to their home countries that have the highest level of 1
st listing premium, not 
those listed in countries with better IPI than home countries. Even if the stocks are listed 
in a country with lower IPI than their home countries, they still have positive 1
st listing 
premium.  Also,  the  regression  analysis  shows  that  foreign  listings  are  all  negatively 
related to the listing country’s Rule of Law, and this relationship is significant for the 2
nd 
and 3
rd listing, which further undermines the bonding hypothesis.    
While this work addresses some important issues in multiple listing, it only marks 
the beginning of the multiple listing studies. Further analysis in foreign listing needs to be 
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Table 1 Summary of Data 
 
This table provides the home and listing countries for stocks listed in 2, 3, and 4 markets. The 
listings are in sequential order. 
    2 Market  3 Market  4 Market 


















3rd  1  Argentina  1     1                   
2  Australia  24  8  11  5  5  4  1  1  1 
3  Austria  3  2  2  1        1       
4  Bangladesh           1                
5  Belgium  4  16  4  9  31  4  2  2  9 
6  Brazil     1                      
7  Canada  17  20  45  16  7  3  3  2    
8  Chile  5     1  1           1    
9  China     1                      
10  Colombia                            
11  Cyprus                            
12  Czech 
Republic 
   2  1                   
13  Denmark  1  1     1  1             
14  Egypt                            
15  Finland     2  4  1  1             
16  France  7  11  16  11  4  10  7  13  3 
17  Germany  40  75  10  135  237  2  18  16  28 
18  Greece     1  1  1                
19  Hong Kong  7  3  18  2  1     1  3  1 
20  Hungary  1  3  3  1                
21  India  2     4           1       
22  Indonesia  1     1                   
23  Ireland  4  2  1     2  1  1       
24  Israel  2  7     1  5     1     1 
25  Italy  3  3  5     2  1     1  1 
26  Japan  39  6  57  8  7  5  1  4  1 
27  Kenya     1                      
28  Luxembourg      11     2        2     2 
29  Malaysia  9  3  2           1       
30  Mauritius           1                
31  Mexico  3                         
32  Morocco  1  1                    1 
33  Netherlands  8  12  5  8  13  5  1  3  7 
34  Netherlands                    1       
35  New Zealand     10              1  1  1 
36  Norway  2  1     5     1        1 
37  Pakistan  1     1                   
38  Peru              3        2  3 
39  Philippines     2                      
40  Poland     2        2             
41  Portugal  2  1  1                   
42  Russia        2                     22 
43  Singapore  7  4  3  2  1             
44  South Africa  2  4  2  2  1  1  3  1    
45  South Korea  1  2  4  1                
46  Spain  3  3  3  1     1          
47  Sri Lanka     1  1                   
48  Sweden     1  6  4  3           1 
49  Switzerland  4  12  3  15  14  1  11  9  8 
50  Taiwan  4  6  1     2             
51  Thailand  1  1                      
52  Turkey  3                         
53  U.K.  30  20  50  13  9  14  6  4  2 
54  U.S.  95  76  128  148  46  24  14  14  6 
55  Venezuela  1                         
56  Zimbabwe  1  1     1                
   Sum  339  339  397  397  397  77  77  77  77 
1
st Listing Total  813=339+397+77 
2
nd Listing Total  474=397+77 
3
rd Listing Total  77 
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Table 2 Summary of Listings 
 
This table summarizes number of the foreign listings in terms of difference between home and listing 
country  Investor  Protection  Index  (IPI),  listing  date,  and  listing  regions.  The  region  ‘AUD’  includes 
developed countries in Asia-Pacific area such as Japan, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and others. 
  
IPI(Home)-
IPI(Listing)  Listing Date  Listing Region       
   <0  0  >0  <1990 
1990-
1999  >1999 
North 
America  EU 
Develop 
-ing  AUD  Subtotal 
1st Listing  275  109  429  159  544  110  277  437  25  74  813 
2nd Listing  83  33  358  65  228  181  71  352  15  36  474 
3rd Listing  15  2  60  3  49  25  6  61  4  6  77 
Subtotal  373  144  847  227  821  316  354  850  44  116   
Total      1364      1364        1364  1364 
 
Table 3 Changes in Listings in U.S. and EU Region over Time 
 
This table gives the percentage of firms listed in U.S. and EU in different time period. For example, in the 
third column and second row, the 0.02 indicates that 2% of the total dual listing (stocks listed 2 markets, 
home country and U.S.) in our sample is placed before 1990. 
By Hosting 
Country 
 By Listing 
Time  2 MKT 
3 MKT 
1st 







3rd  Average 
Before 90  0.02  0.09  0.04        0.05 
During 90s  0.58  0.82  0.56  1.00  1.00  0.83  0.80 
After 2000  0.40  0.09  0.40        0.17  0.27 
US 
  
Sum  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Before 90  0.02  0.20  0.02  0.04  0.26  0.04  0.10 
During 90s  0.36  0.63  0.53  0.58  0.65  0.60  0.56 
After 2000  0.62  0.16  0.45  0.39  0.09  0.36  0.35 
 EU 
  
 Sum  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
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Table 4 Summary of Data and Variables 
 
List of Data / 
Notation  Explanation  Data Source 
Price  Daily Prices  DataStream 
Industry  DataStream Classification. 8 different industries  DataStream 
D/E  Debt to Equity Ratio. High leveraged firms are more likely to 
raise equity capital  World Scope 
P/E  Price to earning ratio. Firms with high P/E ratio are fast 
growing firms which are likely to need more capital  World Scope 
NO. of Employee  Number of Employee.   World Scope 
Total Asset.   Total Asset  World Scope 
M/B   Market to Book Value ratio  World Scope 
ROE  Return on Equity  World Scope 
IPI  Investor Protection Index  LLSV (1998) 
Economics 
Freedom 
It indicates the degree of economic freedom for each country. 
higher values indicating better economic freedom 
Frasier  
Institute 
Rule of law  Higher scores corresponding to better outcomes  World Bank  
Culture index  
High values indicate a high degree of inequality, 
collectivism, difference in role/value of gender and less 







Table 5 Industry Summary of the Multiple Listed Firms. 
 
This table shows the number of firms from different industry in 2, 3 and 4 markets cases. 
Industry  2 Market  3 Market  4 Market  Sum 
Oil & Gas  24  17  7  48 
Basic Materials  43  50  9  102 
Industrials  65  61  11  137 
Consumer Goods  46  36  9  91 
Health Care  15  42  4  61 
Consumer Services  33  39  7  79 
Telecommunications  3  21  5  29 
Utilities  11  11  2  24 
Financials  62  43  14  119 
Technology  37  77  9  123 
 Sum  339  397  77  813 
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Table 6  Firm Characteristics at Each Foreign Listing 
 
This table summarizes the basic firm characteristics upon the 1
st, 2
nd and 3
rd foreign listing for stocks listed 
in 2, 3 and 4 markets. 
   2 MKT 








4 MKT  
3rd 
Total Asset ($Million) 3.93  4.01   7.45  22.51  74.84  74.89 
NO. of Employees  15050.10  15707.99  17565.11  53270.72  59890.02  60710.03 
D/E Ratio  67.54  58.57  62.93  61.63  81.11  78.41 
M/B Ratio  2.22  3.13  3.18  2.29  2.60  2.89 
P/E Ratio  29.01  30.81  32.82  17.07  23.97  22.01 
ROE  9.25  9.31  9.01  15.99  12.71  12.98 
 
 
Table 7 Mean Abnormal Return for Event Window (-10, 2) 
 
This table presents the daily mean abnormal returns from 10 days before the foreign listing to 2 days after 
the foreign listing for stocks listed in 2, 3, and 4 markets. The foreign listings are in consequential order. 
  2 Market  3 Market   4 Market  
  1st  1st  2nd  1st  2nd  3rd 
-10  0.23%  0.07%  -0.03%  0.08%  0.02%  -0.13% 
-9  0.27%  0.21%  0.44%***  0.35%**  4.24%  0.38%** 
-8  0.94%*  0.22% *  0.03%  0.18%  -0.88%  -0.26% 
-7  -0.10%  0.15%  0.18%**  0.31%  -0.25%  -1.13% 
-6  0.75%**  0.00%  0.19%  -0.06%  0.42%*  0.33% 
-5  0.57%*  -0.02%  0.018**  0.17%*  3.11%  0.25% 
-4  0.09%  0.18%  -0.17%  0.06%  -1.13%  0.11% 
-3  0.13%  0.27% *  0.05%  -0.05%  3.15%  0.16% 
-2  -0.19%  0.07%  0.02%  0.27%*  0.23%  -0.19% 
-1  0.51%  0.37%**  -0.06%  -0.03%  -1.09%  0.08% 
0  0.82%**  0.47%**  -0.02%  0.01%  3.68%  -0.26% 
1  -0.83%  -0.10%  -0.13%  -0.08%  -0.95%  -0.05% 
2  -0.31%  -0.20%  -0.02%  0.32%  -0.17%  -0.42%* 
 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
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Table 8 T and Rank Test Results for CAR during (-10, -1) 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal return 10 days before and 2 days after the foreign listing for 
stocks listed in 2, 3, and 4 markets.  Different statistical tests are also reported together with the CAR. 
    Test  (-10,-1)  (1,+2) 
Mean CAR  0.92%  -0.09% 
 Patell Z  0.906**  -1.052 
t  1.46*  -0.304 
2 Market 1st 
listing 
 Generalized Sign Z  2.935***  3.424*** 
Mean CAR  1.51%  -0.30% 
 Patell Z  2.41***  -1.77** 
t  2.85***  -1.045 
3 Market 1st 
listing 
 Generalized Sign Z  3.28***  0.267 
Mean CAR  0.82%  -0.15% 
Patell Z  2.46***  -0.82 
t  1.56*  -0.64 
3 Market 2nd 
listing 
 Generalized Sign Z  3.44***  0.14 
Mean CAR  1.30%  0.23% 
Patell Z  1.88**  0.99 
t  2.22**  0.59 
4 Market 1st 
listing 
 Generalized Sign Z  2.87***  3.14*** 
Mean CAR  0.54%  -1.12% 
 Patell Z  1.59*  -0.26 
t  1.07  -1.06 
4 Market 2nd 
listing 
 Generalized Sign Z  0.72  0.72 
Mean CAR  -0.41%  -0.47% 
Patell Z  -1.93**  0.16 
t  -0.26  -1.11 
4 Market 3rd 
listing 
 Generalized Sign Z  -0.16  1.29* 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail test. 
 
Table 9 Summary of Listing Premium According to IPI and Listing Date 
The Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) are accumulated within different groups according to different 
listing periods, regions and difference between home IPI and listing countries IPI. Any category containing 
10 stocks or less is not reported. 
   IPI(Home)-IPI(Listing)  Listing  Date  Region 
   <0  0  >0  <1990 
1990-
1999  >1999 
North 
America  EU 
 Developing 
Market  AUD 
CAR1  1.25%*** 3.78%*** 0.6%*  -0.50%  1.54%***  2.45%* 3.32%*** -0.09%  1.28%  2.15%* 
CAR2  0.99%**  -2.30%  0.89%  0.53%  0.77%*  1.31%  -0.47%  0.73%*  2.70%  0.74% 
CAR3  1.06%    -5.40%  1.42%  -3.80%  0.22%  0.94%  1.28%     
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail test.   27 
Table 10 Cross Sectional Regression  
The  Cumulative  Abnormal  Returns  are  regressed  on  a  set  of  explanatory  variables  which  include  the 
Investor  Protection  Index  (IPI),  Economics  freedom,  Culture,  Rule  of  Law  and  dummy  variables  of 
different listing listing regions. AUD Dummy is the dummy variables for listings in developed countries in 
Asia-Pacific area. Variable_n is the explanatory variable of the n
th listing country. 
   CAR1     CAR2  CAR3 
Intercept  -4.72   -14.19
   -0.63   3.40   -5.10   -18.97 3 -2.85 27.53   0.71   40.53 
IPI  0.33*  0.35*  0.36  0.17  0.21  0.16    0.86 0.51  0.88  0.87 
IPI_1  0.56***  0.34  0.09        -0.27    -0.26
          -1.07*  0.76 
Economics 
Freedom_1       1.26   -0.28             
               
Rule of Law_1       -0.80   0.20             
               
Culture _1       0.04   0.01              
               
IPI_2                -0.17  -0.55  -0.34
          0.50  0.60 
Economics 
Freedom_2                     1.85*  4.25**             
Rule of Law_2           -0.84        -2.47*  -5.37*              
Culture _2           0.04        -0.04   -0.02
               
IPI_3                          
   -0.68 -0.59  -0.71  -2.27* 
Economics 
Freedom_3                          
      -0.16      -3.92 
Rule of Law_3                          
      -1.34*      -7.48 
Culture _3                          
      -0.43*      -0.56**
US Dummy           2.24*           1.06             15.10 
EU  Dummy           -0.77           0.68              2.52 
AUD  Dummy          1.01           1.38             12.25* 
Developing 
Dummy           -1.38             -3.94              -15.86 
R Square  1.24   1.44
   3.99    0.26    1.32    4.56      6.51   4.41   11.56 
 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail T test. All the numbers are in percentage.  
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